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INTRODUCTION
Commentators describe the institution of the American jury as both
a blessing and a curse. On the positive side, scholars hail the jury as a
1
stalwart protector of defendants from an overly oppressive government.
Judges praise juries for providing an additional measure of perceived
2
fairness and credibility to the United States legal system. The presence
3
of a jury tends to encourage simplification of complex issues. Further,
service on a jury provides a practical education in civics to the American
4
public. These praises, however, are sung more loudly in some corners
of the legal world than in others. For example, many practitioners in

*Amy Tindell attended Dartmouth College with a major in Cognitive Science and continued
her education at the University of Michigan to complete a Ph.D. in Biopsychology. Amy
graduated from Boston College Law School in May 2008 and now practices intellectual
property law at Bromberg & Sunstein LLP in Boston.
1. Davin M. Stockwell, Comment, A Jury of One’s (Technically Competent) Peers?, 21
WHITTIER L. REV. 645, 662–63 (2000).
2. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Ariz., 738 F.2d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1984); see also
Stockwell, supra note 1.
3. Deborah M. Altman, Comment, Defining the Role of the Jury in Patent Litigation:
The Court Takes Inventory, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 699, 707 (1997).
4. See generally D. GRAHAM BURNETT, A TRIAL BY JURY (2001).
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patent law view jury fact-finding in their cases as a curse. At best,
patent litigators may perceive juries as simply unequipped to
understand complex technical, scientific, and legal standards involved in
5
patent cases. Tangential issues are thus viewed as more likely to sway a
patent jury that does not understand more challenging issues central to
6
a case. At worst, patent juries are thought to be just plain biased in
favor of patentees who have the benefit of approval from the experts at
7
the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).
In accordance with these critiques of juries in patent trials, the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) has narrowed the
8
role of the jury in patent trials. Moreover, the Supreme Court has for
9
the most part affirmed these Federal Circuit’s decisions. The reasoning
of these opinions that limit the jury’s role in patent litigation stands in a
shadow cast by the Seventh Amendment’s codification of the right to a
10
jury trial in certain civil trials. The combination of developing patent
law and varying interpretations of how to apply the Seventh
Amendment to patent cases has created the current inconsistent
approach to the division of labor between judges and juries in patent
litigation.
Despite limits placed on jury decision-making in patent cases and
practitioner complaints about jury outcomes, the number of patent cases
11
involving juries is increasing. Statistical analyses of recent patent cases
confirm that whether a judge or jury serves as the fact-finder has a
12
significant impact on outcomes even though neither fact-finder
13
traditionally has technical or scientific training. The Federal Circuit’s
juggling of factual matters, legal matters, precedent, and the Seventh
Amendment in patent cases demonstrates that perhaps the round peg of
patent law does not fit into the proverbial rectangular jury box.
In an attempt to fit these incongruous pieces together, this paper will

5. Gregory D. Leibold, Comment, In Juries We Do Not Trust: Appellate Review of
Patent-Infringement Litigation, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 623, 624 (1996).
6. Id.
7. See id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 624–25.
10. See generally Altman, supra note 3.
11. Id. at 699–700.
12. Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside
the Black Box, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 209, 212–13 (2001–2002).
13. See Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating Expertise on Fact, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 877, 888–89 (2002).
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trace the development of Seventh Amendment precedent in the context
of patent litigation to its current status. Further, this paper proposes a
system akin to peer review to replace the traditional jury in patent trials.
Such a system would be analogous to the current “Peer-to-Patent”
experiment at the PTO, wherein scientific and technical experts have
the opportunity to aid PTO examiners in determining the validity of
14
patents.
The patent system is a unique system in American law
because it boasts its own bar and its own governmental agency; in turn,
its own court demands its own jury tailored to fill in the adjudicatory
15
gap. Adjudication of such public rights as those involved in patent
16
validity would find increased efficiency and credibility with public
expert input. Moreover, given that there are few constitutional
constraints on adjudication of public rights, such a process likely would
17
survive constitutional scrutiny. The area of patent law provides the
American legal system with a unique opportunity to develop flexibility
in the context of an otherwise cumbersome division of fact and law.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SEVENTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE
The Seventh Amendment provides, “[i]n [s]uits at common law, . . .
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than
18
according to the rules of common law.” The amendment seems to
provide for the right to a jury trial in civil suits, but its language is
19
unclear, especially when compared to that of the Sixth Amendment.
14. See Ethan Katsh & Beth Noveck, Peer to Peer Meets the World of Legal
Information: Encountering a New Paradigm, 99 LAW LIBR. J. 365, 371–72 (2007).
15. See Stockwell, supra note 1, at 683–85.
16. See Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 604 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
[T]he grant of a valid patent is primarily a public concern. Validity often is brought
into question in disputes between private parties, but the threshold question usually
is whether the PTO, under the authority assigned to it by Congress, properly
granted the patent. At issue is a right that can only be conferred by the government.
Id. See also In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, J., dissenting), vacated
sub nom. Am. Airlines v. Lockwood, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995) (“This court has held that the issue
of validity of a patent involves public rights, not merely private rights.”).
17. See Stockwell, supra note 1, at 691–92.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
19. The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides,
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
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For example, the Sixth Amendment embraces within its scope “all
criminal prosecutions,” but the Seventh Amendment leaves open the
20
extent of its application to “[s]uits at common law.” Additionally, the
Sixth Amendment requires that the accused “shall enjoy” the right,
while the Seventh Amendment employs the more permissive phrase
21
that the right “shall be preserved.” Finally, the Sixth Amendment
specifies from where the jury will be drawn, while the Seventh
Amendment makes no such specification, leaving jury composition
22
open.
The language of the Sixth Amendment demonstrates “that
Congress knew how to use [clear,] express language when it drafted the
23
The Supreme Court has interpreted the
Seventh Amendment.”
different phrasings of the Sixth and Seventh Amendments to mean that
the right to a jury trial is mandated in criminal cases but not in civil
24
cases.
Further, the Supreme Court has ruled that the Seventh
Amendment, unlike the Sixth Amendment, is not essential to due
25
process and thus not applicable to the states.
The traditional role of the American jury under both the Sixth and
Seventh Amendments has been to decide questions of fact, as opposed
26
to legal matters.
This responsibility was established first by the
Judiciary Act, which was enacted before the Seventh Amendment was
27
ratified. The Judiciary Act provided that “the trial of issues in fact, in
28
the district courts . . . shall be by jury.” The Seventh Amendment itself
expressly notes that “facts” initially tried by the jury may not be re29
examined in a U.S. court.
Finally, the Supreme Court generally
affirmed this notion, stating that “[q]uestions of fact in common law
30
actions shall be settled by a jury . . .” and warning that “the ultimate

witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defen[s]e.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
20. Stockwell, supra note 1, at 656.
21. Id. at 656–57.
22. Id. at 657.
23. Id.
24. See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 152–56, 162–63 (1973); see also Stockwell,
supra note 1, at 657.
25. Leibold, supra note 5, at 651; see also Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92–93 (1875).
26. See Paul F. Kirgis, The Right to a Jury Decision on Questions of Fact Under the
Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1125, 1131–32 (2003).
27. Id. at 1133.
28. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, sec. 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
30. Walker v. N.M. & S. Pac. R.R. Co., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897).
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determination of issues of fact by the jury [shall] be not interfered
31
with.”
Recently, however, the Supreme Court has shifted its focus away
from the fact-law distinction to other concerns. In the 1987 case of Tull
v. United States, for example, the Supreme Court applied a two-prong
historical-analog test to determine whether a real estate developer
accused of violating the Clean Water Act was entitled to a trial by jury
32
under the Seventh Amendment.
The first step of the test was to
determine whether the present action was analogous to a suit at
common law, as opposed to a suit in equity or admiralty, as of the 18th
33
century—the time of the Seventh Amendment.
The second prong
34
examined whether the remedy sought was legal or equitable in nature.
Taking into account the nature of the action and the remedy sought, the
Court focused on the latter and found the case closely analogous to
punitive damages in the 18th century, which were available in courts of
35
law. Although the result suggested that Tull was entitled to a jury trial
36
on some issues, the Court took it one step further. It stated that the
civil penalties involved in Tull’s trial were not a “fundamental element
of a jury trial” because Congress may fix those penalties by statute and
37
therefore may delegate such responsibilities to judges.
The Supreme Court in Tull further observed that in the past it
considered “practical limitations of a jury trial and its functional
compatibility with proceedings outside of traditional courts of law” to
38
find that a litigant was not entitled to a jury trial. A later decision
qualified this consideration as applying only where “public rights” were
39
at issue. Unlike “private rights,” Congress may assign causes of action
40
Although the
involving “public rights” to a non-Article III court.
Federal Circuit ignored this comment in In re Lockwood, stating that an
action for a declaration of patent invalidity may be brought in an Article
III court because declaratory judgments may be brought properly in an

31. Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 310 (1920).
32. 481 U.S. 412, 414, 417–18 (1987).
33. Id. at 417.
34. Id. at 417–18.
35. Id. at 423–24.
36. See id. at 425 (“We must[,] . . . whether Congress can, consistent with the Seventh
Amendment, authorize judges to assess civil penalties.”).
37. Id. at 426–27.
38. Id. at 418 n.4.
39. Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 53 (1989).
40. Id. at 52–55.
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41

Article III court, the relevance of the court’s decision should not be
underestimated. For example, many issues relevant to public rights in
42
patents may be decided at the PTO, thus falling outside of Article III.
With its specialization in technical and scientific fields, the PTO may be
more “functionally compatible” with patent issues than a lay jury.
Indeed, commentators and courts have long debated whether juries
43
are competent to decide certain issues. Alexander Hamilton posited in
his Federalist Paper Number Eighty-three that very complex issues
“require often such long, deliberate, and critical investigation as would
be impracticable to men called from their occupations, and obliged to
44
decide before they were permitted to return to them.”
Hamilton
worried that demanding that lay juries decide issues that are too
45
complicated may undermine respect for the jury system. Although not
addressing lay juries in particular, Judge Learned Hand later criticized
generalist courts and “the extraordinary condition of the law which
makes it possible for a man without any knowledge of even the
rudiments of [science and technology] to pass upon such questions” of
46
high difficulty and complexity. Similarly, and more recently, Judge
Michel of the Federal Circuit reflected that businesses and corporations
competing in high stakes technology races may pressure Congress to
47
increase specialization in U.S. courts. Because their cases have such
large economic and practical impacts, these businesses are unlikely to
trust a lay and generalist system with their intellectual property

41. 50 F.3d 966, 972 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1995), vacated sub nom. Am. Airlines v. Lockwood,
515 U.S. 1182 (1995).
The Court has cautioned that the Seventh Amendment does not automatically
entitle a party to a jury trial if Congress can and has assigned adjudication of the
legal claim concerning such public right exclusively to an administrative agency.
However, as “[n]o one disputes that an action for a . . . [declaration of patent
invalidity] may properly be brought in an Article III court,” this limitation on
Seventh Amendment protection “does not affect our analysis.”
Id. (quoting Chauffeurs v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 n.4 (1990)) (citation omitted).
42. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2000).
43. See Beth Z. Shaw, Judging Juries: Evaluating Renewed Proposals for Specialized
Juries From a Public Choice Perspective, 2006 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 3, ¶¶ 14–16 (2006).
44. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 527 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed., 1961).
45. Id. at 527–28.
46. Shaw, supra note 43, ¶ 24 (quoting Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F.
95, 115 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911)) (alteration in original).
47. Shaw, supra note 43, ¶ 25; see also Paul R. Michel, Foreword, The Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit Must Evolve to Meet the Challenges Ahead, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1177,
1184–85 (1999).
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48

concerns.
Developing common law has revealed a split in the circuit courts
49
over the so-called “complexity exception” to the Seventh Amendment.
In the case of Ross v. Bernhard in 1970, the court recognized “the
practical abilities and limitations of [a] jur[y]” in deciding the issues as a
factor in determining whether a particular claim gives rise to a jury
50
trial. Later, the Third Circuit ruled that due process may require that a
judge, rather than a jury, try certain cases, for example, when the
complexity of a case prevents a jury from using rational means to find
51
facts and to reach a verdict. The Third Circuit thus recognized an
apparent conflict between the Fifth Amendment due process
52
requirement and the Seventh Amendment jury trial provision.
In
contrast, the Ninth Circuit has refused to recognize a complexity
exception to the Seventh Amendment, noting the difficulties that would
be involved in developing a test to determine the level of complexity
53
required to avoid a jury trial.
The Ninth Circuit asserted that a
complexity exception would “improperly demean[] the intelligence of
54
the citizens of this Nation.”
Further, the court in Kian v. Mirro
Aluminum Co. asserted that proposals for specialized juries were
55
“elitist” and undermined a fundamental right. The Supreme Court, for
its part, has yet to rule yea or nay as the last word on the issue of the
56
complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment.
II. THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF PATENT TRIALS
The Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court’s modern approach to
defining the role of the jury in patent cases began with the case of
57
Markman v. Westview Instruments.
Herbert Markman brought an
action against Westview in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for
48. See Michel, supra note 47, 1184–1185; Shaw, supra note 43, ¶ 25.
49. See Shaw, supra note 43, ¶ 15; see also Philippe Signore, On the Role of Juries in
Patent Litigation (Part 1), 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 791, 817–18 (2001).
50. 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970).
51. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1079, 1084 (3d Cir.
1980) (affirming denial of jury trial in action for violations of the Lanham Act, the Wilson
Tariff Act, the Antidumping Act, and the Sherman Act).
52. Id. at 1084.
53. In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 431–32 (9th Cir. 1979).
54. Id. at 430.
55. 88 F.R.D. 351, 355 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (refusing to strike plaintiff’s jury demand and
denying defendant’s request for expert in patent licensing dispute).
56. See Leibold, supra note 5, at 650–51.
57. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 1535 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
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58

patent infringement, and the jury construed the term “inventory” in
Markman’s patent claims to include “cash” or “invoices” but not
59
“articles of clothing” for a finding of infringement. The district court,
however, granted Westview’s motion for judgment as a matter of law,
asserting that patent claim construction was a matter of law for the court
60
to decide.
The court held that the claim term “inventory” meant
“articles of clothing” and not “cash” or “invoices” and subsequently
61
directed a verdict for noninfringement.
Upon Markman’s appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
62
court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law. The Federal Circuit
agreed that patent claim construction is a legal matter for judges to
decide, likening patent claim construction to statutory interpretation,
63
which is a matter of law for the court. The Federal Circuit agreed with
the district court that a judge may examine the claims, the specification,
and the prosecution history, in addition to weighing extrinsic evidence
64
like expert testimony to construe the meaning of a patent claim term.
The court went even further to grant itself de novo review of claim
65
construction. In a concurring opinion, Judge Mayer asserted that claim
construction traditionally had been a matter of law but that the
66
underlying factual issues must be left to a jury.
Judge Newman
67
vigorously dissented, emphasizing the hazards of de novo review and
tracing the Seventh Amendment provision of a trial by jury in the
68
context of patent cases.

58. Id. at 1536.
59. See id. at 1536–37; see also Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman I),
52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
60. Markman, 772 F.Supp. at 1536.
61. Id. at 1537–38.
62. Markman I, 52 F.3d at 988–89.
63. Id. at 987.
64. Id. at 979–80.
65. Id. at 974.
66. Id. at 989–90 (Mayer, J., concurring). J. Mayer’s opinion includes a string cite of
fourteen Federal Circuit opinions holding the underlying factual inquires of claim
construction to be appropriate matters for jury decision-making. Id.
67. Id. at 999–1000, 1006 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“In resolving litigation controversy
by determining mechanical or chemical or electronic truth, it is hard to understand why
justice should be handicapped in the Federal Circuit by replacement of a live trial with cold
documents.”).
68. Id. at 1000 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The majority today denies 200 years of jury
trial of patent cases in the United States, preceded by over 150 years of jury trial of patent
cases in England, by simply calling a question of fact a question of law. The Seventh
Amendment is not so readily circumvented.”).
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Markman case and
affirmed the Federal Circuit’s finding that patent claim construction is
69
indeed a matter of law for the court to decide.
After the court
construes the relevant claim, a jury may decide whether it is infringed by
70
an accused device. The Court attempted to apply the historical-analog
test and to examine its own precedent but found both analyses
71
inconclusive as to the issue of claim construction. It instead turned its
72
focus to “functional considerations.” The Court asserted that judges
are better-suited than juries to construe patent claims because they have
73
more training and experience in construction of written documents.
Judges, in weighing expert testimony, have superior ability to “evaluate
74
the testimony in relation to the overall structure of the patent.” The
Supreme Court finished by stressing the importance of uniformity in
construing patent claims, a goal more likely accomplished by judicial
75
interpretation than by jury interpretation.
Although the Supreme
Court did not expressly affirm de novo review, the Federal Circuit
affirmed its de novo review standard two years later in Cybor
76
Corporation v. FAS Technologies.
Around the same time that the Federal Circuit decided Markman, it
granted a petition for writ of mandamus directing a district court to
77
reinstate a jury demand in the case of In re Lockwood. In the district
court, Lockwood alleged that American Airlines’ computerized
reservation system infringed two of his patents relating to self-service
78
terminals and automatic ticket dispensing systems.
American
counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment of noninfringement or a
79
judgment that the patents were invalid. The district court granted
80
American’s summary judgment motion on the infringement claim.
After American moved to strike Lockwood’s motion for a jury trial, the

69. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman II), 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996).
70. Id. at 384.
71. See id. at 388.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 388–89.
74. Id. at 390.
75. Id. at 390–91.
76. 138 F.3d 1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
77. 50 F.3d 966, 968 (Fed. Cir. 1995), vacated sub nom. Am. Airlines v. Lockwood, 515
U.S. 1182 (1995).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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district court agreed that because the remaining claims were equitable in
81
nature Lockwood was not entitled to a jury trial.
Upon Lockwood’s petition for a writ of mandamus to the Federal
Circuit, the district court acknowledged that the only claim remaining in
Lockwood’s case was American’s claim for a declaratory judgment of
82
patent invalidity.
The Federal Circuit noted, however, that the
Supreme Court previously established that the equitable or legal nature
of a declaratory judgment action depended on the controversy upon
83
which it was founded. The Federal Circuit found that the underlying
controversy for the instant declaratory judgment action was really a suit
for patent infringement brought by Lockwood with an affirmative
84
defense of invalidity pled by American. Because such a suit could have
been brought at law or at equity during the 18th century, Lockwood was
entitled to have factual questions relevant to the validity of his patents
85
tried before a jury.
The dissent argued compellingly that Seventh
Amendment jury trials are not available for a determination of public
86
rights such as those involved in the validity of a patent. The Supreme
87
Court then vacated and remanded the decision without explanation.
Six years later, however, the Federal Circuit asserted that its reasoning
in Lockwood was “neither supplanted nor questioned” in ruling that a
defendant asserting only an affirmative defense of invalidity is not
entitled to a jury trial where the patentee-plaintiff prays only for the
88
equitable remedy of injunction.
The most recent case addressing the Seventh Amendment right to a
89
jury trial in patent cases is In re Technology Licensing Corporation. In
Technology Licensing, the Federal Circuit endorsed the analysis of a
magistrate judge in a case where the plaintiff sought declaratory
judgment of patent invalidity and the defendant-patentee asserted a
90
counterclaim of infringement, seeking only an injunction.
The

81. Id. at 968–69.
82. See id. at 969 (“The courts concluded that ‘the remaining claims are equitable in
nature [and] the plaintiff [Lockwood] is not entitled to a trial by jury as a matter of right.’”)
(alteration in original).
83. Id. at 973. See also Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 223 (1963) (per curiam).
84. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d. at 974.
85. Id. at 976.
86. Id. at 981 (Nies, J., dissenting).
87. Am. Airlines v. Lockwood, 515 U.S. 1182, 1182 (1995).
88. Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 257 F.3d 1331, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
89. 423 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
90. Id. at 1286–87.
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magistrate judge, relying heavily on the historical-analog test used in
Lockwood, ruled that the case most resembled an infringement action
with a defense of invalidity, with only an equitable remedy sought by
91
the patentee.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the magistrate judge’s
decision that Technology Licensing Corporation was not entitled to a
92
jury trial.
Thus, the general tendency of recent Federal Circuit and Supreme
Court decisions regarding the right to a jury trial in patent cases,
93
although inconsistent, has been to narrow the role of juries.
Particularly the Markman case stripped the jury of a central role in
deciding patent issues because often patent cases turn on the
94
construction of claim terms. Similarly, the KSR International Co. v.
Teleflex, Inc. case decided by the Supreme Court just last year, which
loosened the standards for proving obviousness (and thus invalidating a
95
patent), arguably paves the way for increased trial court summary
judgments against patentees. This trend would take yet another patent
issue, already ultimately a question of law for the judge (with underlying
factual issues), away from the jury. Additionally, the Federal Circuit
has focused on the remedy originally sought by the patentee, whether
96
plaintiff or defendant, in deciding whether to grant a jury trial. When a
patentee requests an equitable remedy, like an injunction, the court is
97
likely to deny a jury trial.
Judges—at least those on the Federal Circuit and the Supreme
Court—seem to believe that juries are less qualified to make decisions
98
in patent cases.
A question remains, however, as to whether the
narrowing of the role of the jury in patent cases is warranted. Are the
outcomes in cases decided by judges and cases decided by juries
different? Do the outcomes reveal faulty reasoning or biases that
negatively affect the administration of justice? If parties nonetheless
increasingly request juries, what do they hope to gain?

91. Id. at 1288.
92. Id. at 1291.
93. See Leibold, supra note 5, at 624–25.
94. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d at 993 (Mayer, J., concurring); id.
at 999 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“Deciding the meaning of the words used in the patent is
often dispositive of the question of infringement.”).
95. 550 U.S. 398, 414–27 (2007).
96. See In re Technology Licensing Corp., 423 F.3d at 1287.
97. See id.
98. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman II), 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
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III. JUDGING JUDGES AND JURIES: WHAT THE STATISTICS SUGGEST
Implicit in the Seventh Amendment’s provision of jury trials in civil
cases is the presumption that there is a reason why a party may choose
to have its trial heard by a judge or a jury. In complex, high stakes, and
expensive cases like patent trials, it is important to explore the
soundness of this presumption, especially when there is a statistically
99
significant bias in favor of the patentee in trial decisions overall. In
tried cases between 1983–1999, patentees won 58% of suits (706 cases)
100
while the alleged infringer prevailed in 42% (503 cases).
This overall statistic could be skewed by particularly biased
outcomes for either jury trials or bench trials. Indeed, the patentee
prevailed in 68% of suits tried by a jury and only 51% cases tried by a
101
judge.
Thus, as anticipated by popular perception, whether the
adjudicator is a judge or a jury in a patent case is a significant predictor
102
Moreover, jury outcomes tend to
of who will win the lawsuit.
fluctuate over time while judge outcomes have remained relatively
103
consistent over the years.
This fluctuation could be due to the fact
that jurors are one-time participants in the legal system and have no
opportunity to learn or to adjust reasoning over time while such
104
experience-building is part of a judge’s job description.
Turning to substantive issues, including validity, enforceability,
infringement, and willful infringement, patentees continue to have the
edge over alleged infringers; however, choice of adjudicator remains
105
predictive of outcome. A patent is more likely than not to be upheld
by both judges and juries, but an outcome of validity is significantly
106
more likely with a jury. Similarly, alleged infringers with defenses of

99. See Moore, supra note 12, at 233 tbl.2. All statistics from the Moore article are
from a data set of cases from 1983 to 1999.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 234.
102. Id. This distinction between judge and jury adjudication is not valid for all types
of trials, however. In a study of product liability and medical malpractice cases, plaintiffs
experienced a higher win rate in bench trials, but not jury trials. Id. at 234–35.
103. Id. at 235.
104. Id. at 237.
105. See id. at 237–38.
106. Id. at 239–40. Juries uphold validity in 71% of cases, while judges uphold validity
in 64% cases. Id. at 239. The data set for these statistics, however, did not include dispositive
motions granted by judges, so it is possible that judicial invalidations were underestimated.
Id. at 240. One study found that judges uphold validity for just over one quarter of the
patents decided in pre-trial motions. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence
on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 212 tbl.3 (1998); Signore, supra note
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unenforceability are successful only 28% of the time with judges and
107
Commentators believe that juries are
25% of the time with juries.
more susceptible to pressure to defer to PTO “experts” than are judges
and thus are less likely to support invalidity or unenforceability defenses
108
of alleged infringers.
In matters of infringement, the trend continues, but differences
109
between judge and jury adjudications are more noticeable.
The
overall rate for a finding of infringement is 65%, or 888 out of 1359
110
decisions. Like validity, a finding of infringement is significantly more
likely with a jury as adjudicator (71% or 503 decisions) than with a
111
judge (59% or 385 decisions). Further, juries find willful infringement
in almost three-fourths of cases (71%), while judges find willful
112
These larger differences between
infringement in only half (53%).
judge and jury decisions in matters of infringement may reflect the
113
differing evidentiary burdens for substantive patent issues.
For
example, an alleged infringer must prove a defense of invalidity or
114
unenforceability by clear and convincing evidence, but the standard
for an alleged infringer to prove noninfringement is preponderance of
115
evidence. Alleged infringer win rates with judge adjudicators reflect
these standards. Alleged infringers win 36% of decisions on validity and
28% on enforceability, but only 41% of decisions on infringement
116
where alleged infringers have a lower evidentiary burden.
Alleged
infringer win rates for jury adjudications do not reflect these different
standards, however, prevailing in 29%, 25%, and 29% decisions for
117
validity, enforceability, and infringement, respectively. These findings
suggest that juries are either influenced by bias for patentees, do not
understand the meaning of differing evidentiary burdens, or ignore the

49, at 821.
107. Moore, supra note 12, at 239. This is not a significant difference.
108. Id. at 239–40.
109. See id.
110. Id. at 237 tbl.4.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 239.
114. Id. at 238; see also Ultra-Tex Surfaces, Inc. v. Hill Bros. Chem. Co., 204 F.3d 1360,
1367 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
115. Moore, supra note 12, at 238; see also Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court
Constr., 172 F.3d 836, 842 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
116. See id. at 237 tbl.4.
117. See id.
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different standards for the substantive issues.
Further, a patentee must prove willfulness—that the infringer
intentionally or recklessly disregarded the patentee’s rights—by clear
119
and convincing evidence. This substantive issue had the largest spread
120
in patentee win rates between judges and juries as adjudicators.
Tellingly, juries find willful infringement as often as they find
infringement, in 71% of cases; whereas judges are less likely to find
willful infringement (53% of decisions) than infringement alone (59%
121
of decisions). Thus, juries appear to be more easily swayed by the idea
that alleged infringers are “bad guys” harboring an intent to steal an
122
innocent victim-patentee’s technology. Balancing out this inequity in
judge and jury adjudications, judges are much more likely choose to
enhance damages in cases in which a judge found willfulness (95% of
cases) than they are to enhance damages in cases in which a jury found
123
willfulness (63% of cases). It is unclear whether judges purposefully
function as a check on juries’ tendency to find willfulness or whether
judges are simply more likely to credit the accuracy of their own
124
findings on the issue of willfulness.
Despite these differences between judicial adjudicators and jury
adjudicators, the Federal Circuit upholds judge and jury findings for the
substantive issues of validity, infringement, and enforceability at an
125
almost identical rate. Therefore, as measured by appellate affirmance
126
The
rates, judge and jury adjudications have comparable accuracy.
Federal Circuit, however, does affirm jury verdicts for willfulness in
94% of decisions, compared to judge verdicts for willfulness in 80% of
127
decisions.
This finding is not surprising, however, given that jury
willfulness findings that are appealed tend to be those where the judge
has enhanced damages; therefore, an appellate court is usually
evaluating a willfulness finding endorsed by both the judge and the jury

118. See id. at 239.
119. Id. at 238; see also Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 195 F.3d 1322, 1334
(Fed. Cir. 1999).
120. See Moore, supra note 12, at 237 tbl.4.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 240–42.
123. Id. at 242.
124. See id.
125. Id. at 247 tbl.7 (finding validity affirmed, jury, 78%, judge, 77%; enforcement
affirmed, jury, 75%, judge, 76%; infringement affirmed, jury, 77%, judge, 82%).
126. See id.
127. Id. at 247 tbl.7.
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in a case.
Fact-finder performance may also be measured by tendency to find
for the same party when multiple issues must be resolved and the
129
tendency to find for the plaintiff.
Judges and juries differ in these
130
measurements as well. While both juries and judges tend to find for
the same party on multiple issues, juries so find significantly more often
131
(87% of cases) than do judges (72% of cases). These numbers suggest
that judges may have superior ability to resolve claims more subtly
132
“issue-by-issue rather than suit-by-suit.” Further, which party files suit
is a significant predictor of who wins patent claims when the jury is the
133
adjudicator but not when the judge is the adjudicator.
Patentees
experience higher win rates when they bring the case compared to
actions brought by an infringer (declaratory judgment action) with the
134
jury as the fact-finder. This data suggests that juries, but not judges,
may have more sympathy towards patentees when patentees themselves
135
bring the case as opposed to alleged infringers. Overall, juries may be
more likely than judges to be swayed by peripheral issues including
136
which party brought the claim in patent cases.
Despite the jury’s partially earned reputation for lack of
understanding in patent cases, the incidence of jury trials on patent
137
issues is increasing. In 1940, only 2.5% of patent cases tried in district
138
courts were heard by juries.
From 1968–1970, that figure remained
unchanged as “juries decided only thirteen of nearly four hundred
139
patent trials in the federal district courts[,]” that is, around 3%. In
contrast, from 1997–1999, juries tried 59% of all patent trials in district
courts, meaning that parties requested their Seventh Amendment rights
140
to a jury trial in those cases.
Perhaps a patentee requesting a jury
hopes that the jury will be impressed by the PTO seal of approval on the

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 246–48.
See id. at 250–51.
See id. at 250–52.
Id. at 252 fig.11.
Id. at 252.
Id. at 254 fig.13, 255 fig.14.
Id. at 253.
Id. at 255.
See id. at 253–54
Id. at 209.
Id. at 210.
Stockwell, supra note 1, at 660.
Moore, supra note 12, at 210.
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141

patent. If a party’s case is weak, attorneys may request a jury in hopes
that technical questions will overwhelm the jury to increase their
142
chances of prevailing.
Or, an attorney may hope that the client’s
position is the “morally” stronger one to elicit sympathy from a more
143
malleable jury. A U.S. company bringing an action against a foreign
company may request a jury trial in hopes of winning through the
144
“home court advantage.”
When examined through an opponent’s
point of view, the reasons above would provide motivation to avoid a
145
jury.
These choices by litigating parties likely account for some
differences in judge-decided versus jury-decided outcomes because the
choices determine what kinds of cases are tried before each fact-finder.
Thus, given the statistics and popular perceptions of juries compared to
judges as fact-finders, it is difficult to understand motivations behind
requesting a jury or a bench trial.
IV. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? FROM PEER-TO-PATENT TO
PEER-REVIEWED LITIGATION
Differences between judges and juries as adjudicators are even more
interesting considering that neither group typically is qualified to find
146
facts in scientifically or technically complex patent cases. Some judges
may have more experience and skill in understanding patent law, but
most do not benefit from any sort of technical training necessary to
147
understand the facts of a typical patent case, which involve difficult
concepts common to fields such as electrical engineering, software
development, biochemistry, and yes, rocket science. Even a judge with
training in one of these areas would likely not be able to understand
subtle differences between technological devices in another area. Thus,
it would seem that, as a fact-finder, neither a legally trained judge nor a
148
lay juror should be expected to perform competently.
One possible solution to this problem of under-qualified fact-finders
in patent cases is to delegate the responsibility to an administrative
141. Signore, supra note 49, at 824.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 824–25.
146. See Rai, supra note 13, at 888–89.
147. See id.; see also United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Judicial
Biographies, available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judgbios.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2009)
(noting that Judges Gajarsa, Linn, Lourie, Moore, and Newman have technical backgrounds).
148. See Rai, supra note 13, at 888–89.
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149

tribunal.
As noted above, the Supreme Court has held that the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial depends upon the nature of the
150
issue and the forum.
The Seventh Amendment does not apply to
151
Further, Congress has the discretion to
public rights, for example.
establish administrative tribunals to decide an issue without a jury if the
152
issue involves patent rights as public rights. This discretion holds even
153
Thus, Congress
if a public right is enforced against a private party.
could dedicate a special fact-finding section of the PTO to hold its own
154
tribunals or simply to assist a court in fact-finding. The PTO may hire
specialists across all scientific and technical areas to ensure accuracy and
155
Any judicial review would have a
consistency across patent cases.
standard deferential to the PTO with respect to the fact-finding.
An alternative and more experimental solution, drawing on Beth
156
Noveck’s current Peer-to-Patent program at the PTO, involves a
specialized jury more akin to peer review than to twelve experts sitting
in a jury box during trial. The Peer-to-Patent program, also called the
Community Patent Review Project, is a collaboration between the New
York Law School Institute for Information Law & Policy and the PTO
aimed at more thorough, efficient, and effective review of patent
157
applications so that only valid and meritorious patents are issued. The
program employs public consultation software to allow qualified
members of the public to submit prior art and commentary relevant to
particular patents to the currently overworked and overextended
158
examiners at the PTO. The software allows self-selecting contributors
to rate and rank the information submitted, as well as each other, based
159
on expertise and usefulness in the process.
The Peer-to-Patent
program “builds upon the notion that expertise is not centralized but

149. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S.
442, 460–61 (1977).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 450.
152. See id. at 455.
153. Id. at 452–55.
154. See Stockwell, supra note 1, at 688.
155. Id. at 688–89.
156. For more on the development of the Peer-to-Patent program, see Posting of
Nancy Scola to Science Progress, http://www.scienceprogress.org/2008/08/better-patentsthrough-crowdsourcing/ (Aug. 29, 2008). See also Katsh & Noveck, supra note 14.
157. Katsh & Noveck, supra note 14, at 371.
158. Id. at 367, 371.
159. Id. at 372.
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distributed in the minds of those with the requisite knowledge.”
Considering that neither the average judge nor the average
randomly-selected jury has the “requisite” knowledge to understand
161
fact-finding in the average patent case, a system similar to Peer-toPatent may provide assistance in patent litigation. Similar software
could be used to allow experts in relevant fields to learn about a
particular disputed factual issue in a particular case and then weigh in,
162
providing support for the opinion. For example, experts could submit
prior art relevant to validity issues such as novelty, obviousness, and
163
anticipation—as in the Peer-to-Patent program —or experts could
identify sources that explain the meaning of particular term claims in
the relevant technical field. Additionally, experts could comment on the
differences between two devices to determine infringement issues.
Information and experts would be rated and ranked so that the software
would present the most relevant and important contributions first to the
164
legal adjudicator of the case. Such ranking of information and experts
would prevent the adjudicator from being swamped with irrelevant
postings. Further, experts would be identified and asked to reveal any
conflicts of interest, incurring more effective accountability than a
traditional peer review system. Such biographical information together
with rankings would hold accountable self-proclaimed “experts” in
likely satisfaction of Daubert issues and allow the community of the
relevant field to question or even disqualify a poster as an expert.
This fact-finding system based on Peer-to-Patent could be applied
whether the dispute is resolved in an Article III court, in an
administrative tribunal at the PTO, or in a collaboration between the
165
two.
Congress has the authority to amend patent litigation and to
166
establish new jury practices for it.
Of course, the software would

160. Id. at 371.
161. See Rai, supra note 13, at 888–89.
162. Cf. Katsh & Noveck, supra note 14, at 371–72 (“Using communication technology,
it is possible to create a new mechanism for large-scale distributed decision making that
distinguishes legal from scientific decisions. With procedures in place to distribute but
interconnect these two forms of expertise, it is possible to create new mechanisms for making
administrative decisions more broadly.”) (citations omitted).
163. See id.
164. Cf. id. at 372 (“Participating reviewers could use the original software not only to
submit bibliographic information, but also to rank that information. In so doing, they would
collaboratively create a rank-ordered list of citations. The software would then forward only
the top ten citations to the patent examiner for review.”).
165. See Stockwell, supra note 1, at 682–85.
166. Id. at 683; see In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 982–83 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, J.,
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eliminate much of what composes the fact-finding portion of a patent
trial currently, with attorneys presenting the court with evidence, and
expert witnesses giving opinions on the stand. This process would rely
instead on paper and on technology but certainly could be applied
without offending Seventh Amendment, due process, or equal
167
protection concerns.
The proposed program could be implemented consistently with the
168
provisions of the Seventh Amendment. The Supreme Court has noted
in the past that “[n]ew devices may be used to adapt the ancient
institution [of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial] to present
needs and to make of it an efficient instrument in the administration of
169
justice.”
As to patent cases in particular, the Federal Circuit has
asserted, “[a] constitutional jury right to determine validity of a patent
170
does not attach to this public [patent] grant.” The Patent Clause itself
contains no reference to juries, and there is evidence that the founders
considered, and rejected, providing a clause that patent cases should be
171
172
heard by a jury. Further, the historical-analog test used by the courts
is inappropriate for modern-day patent cases because it improperly
focuses on the legal posturing of the case, rather than the nature of the
fact-finding that must be accomplished by the jury. Indeed, the
historical-analog test assumes that a jury would have the capability to
173
find facts using rational means. The 18th century founders could not
have anticipated the complexity of modern cases for which lay jurors
174
would have no rational means of understanding. Thus, reference back
to the founders’ legal structuring is not an effective means to determine
dissenting), vacated sub nom. Am. Airlines v. Lockwood, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995); see also The
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 202
(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (1984)) (changing litigation requirements regarding new
drugs).
167. See Stockwell, supra note 1, at 690–93.
168. See id. at 690, 692.
169. See id. at 683 (quoting In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 309–10 (1920)) (alteration in
original).
170. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 983 (Nies, J., dissenting).
171. See Stockwell, supra note 1, at 690–91.
172. See, e.g., Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417–18 (1987).
173. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1079 (3d Cir. 1980)
The law presumes that a jury will find facts and reach a verdict by rational means. It
does not contemplate scientific precision but does contemplate a resolution of each
issue on the basis of a fair and reasonable assessment of the evidence and a fair and
reasonable application of the relevant legal rules.
Id.
174. See id.
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who should preside as a proper fact-finder. This new software program
that would allow experts to come to a consensus on complex patent
issues through a rational process, though not a traditional “jury,” would
more faithfully fulfill the demands of the Seventh Amendment.
Applying the Peer-to-Patent program to patent litigation would also
stand up to due process and equal protection concerns. Due process
requires a balance between governmental interests and private interests
in the context of governmental abuse of power or a deprivation of life,
175
liberty, or property.
As a preliminary matter, patent validity
constitutes an area of strong public interest rather than private interest
176
in patents.
The government harbors a strong interest in consistent,
uniform, and accurate adjudication of patent public rights that outweigh
177
Legislation from Congress implementing
residual private interests.
the program would not be an abuse of power or a deprivation because
there is no automatic right to a jury trial in patent cases in the first
178
place.
If anything, the right to due process would be fortified by a
179
provision for technically competent fact-finders.
Along similar lines, since a jury trial in patent cases is not a
fundamental right, and jury reviewers would not be distinguished by any
suspect or quasi-suspect classification, only rational basis review under
180
equal protection would apply. Since a system of expert fact-finders for
patent cases would constitute a rational means to protect a legitimate
governmental interest of effective and efficient adjudication of patent
rights, Congress’ implementation of this program would not offend
equal protection concerns.
The Peer-to-Patent program as applied to patent litigation would
increase the efficiency and the effectiveness of fact-finding in patent
trials. The legal adjudicator, whether a judge or a PTO administrator,
would have the benefit of experts from the relevant technical field
weighing in on complex factual issues not suitable for unaided judge or
lay jury determination. Such a program would introduce a new source
of relevant information to the legal system, as well as expand its concept
175. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332–35 (1976).
176. See Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 604 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re
Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 981–82 (1995) (Nies, J., dissenting).
177. See Stockwell, supra note 1, at 692; Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.
(Markman II), 517 U.S. 370, 390–91 (1996).
178. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
179. See Leibold, supra note 5, at 649–50.
180. See U.S. R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) (rational basis review);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage as an example of a fundamental right).
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of what constitutes legitimate authority for decision-making.
The
Peer-to-Patent program at the PTO has enjoyed apparent success so far
as influential companies like Microsoft, Sun Microsystems, IBM,
Hewlett Packard, and General Electric have offered their patents as
182
guinea pigs. It is possible these companies believe that such a process
offers an opportunity for increased legitimacy of their patents. Further,
examiners have used information supplied by self-appointed experts and
183
in two cases relied primarily on that information to reject claims.
Gathering information from experts using modern technology may have
a place in patent litigation as well as in prosecution.
CONCLUSION
The complexity of modern patent litigation is difficult to square with
the Seventh Amendment provision of trial by jury in some civil cases.
Indeed, recent Supreme Court and Federal Circuit decisions have
narrowed the role of the jury in patent cases. This reduced jury role is
perhaps warranted as statistics from patent trials suggest that juries may
not understand technical issues as well as judges (e.g., evidentiary
standards), and that juries may be biased or swayed by peripheral
concerns. Erosion of the traditional jury system for patent trials should
not be alarming, however, given the public nature of patent rights and
the lack of constitutional or statutory mandate for jury fact-finding in
patent cases.
Further, although judges may possess extensive
experience and skill in patent law, they are also likely inappropriate
fact-finders in the world of patents due to their lack of technical or
scientific expertise.
To accomplish effective fact-finding in patent litigation, Congress
may implement a special information-gathering system through modern
software. This system would be analogous to the Peer-to-Patent
program currently underway at the PTO, wherein self-selected experts
weigh in on prior art issues relevant to a patent in front of an examiner.
A distributed network of experts would come to a collaborative
consensus on disputed issues in a trial through rating and ranking
information and each other, creating a clearer picture for the legal
adjudicator. It is likely that this program would overcome constitutional

181. See Katsh & Noveck, supra note 14, at 365.
182. The Peer to Patent Project: Community Peer Review of Patents, USPTO Office
Actions and Early Peer-to-Patent Results, http://cairns.typepad.com/peertopatent/2008/02/
uspto-office-ac.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2009).
183. Id.
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challenges. It would, however, challenge stagnated views of what
constitutes a “jury” and of appropriate sources of information and
authority in the legal system.

